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Abstract
The thesis deals with the estimation of labour supply responses to the personal
income tax reform in the Czech Republic adopted in 2008 by applying quasi
experimental design known as “difference-in-differences”. By exploiting the
different change in the effective tax rates for various population subgroups as
a natural experiment and using microdata from European Labour Force Sur-
vey we constructed the treatment and control groups according to the highest
attained level of education serving as a proxy for an income range that assigns
an individual to the particular tax bracket before and after policy change.
Analysing one-person households we found significant negative effect on the
labour force participation and significant positive effect on the hours work of
the treated by comparing these outcomes for the treatment and control groups
in the baseline and follow up periods before and after the reform.
JEL Classification C21, D04, H24, H31, I38, J22





Práce se zabývá odhadem reakćı nab́ıdky práce na reformu daně z př́ıjmu
zavedenou v České republice v roce 2008 aplikováńım kvazi experimentálńı
metody známé jako “rozd́ıl-v-rozd́ılech”. Využit́ım rozd́ılných změn v efekt-
ivńıch daňových sazbách pro r̊uzné skupiny společnosti jako přirozeného ex-
perimentu a s použit́ım dat z Evropského pr̊uzkumu pracovńı śıly jsme zkon-
struovali experimentálńı a kontrolńı skupiny na základě nejvyšš́ıho dosaženého
vzděláńı, slouž́ıćıho jako aproximace rozmeźı př́ıjmu, který jednotlivce přirazuje
do konkrétńıho daňového pásma před a po reformě. Analýzou jednočlenných
domácnost́ı jsme nalezli signifikantńı negativńı efekt na participaci na trhu
práce a signifikantńı pozitivńı efekt na pracovńı dobu experimentálńı skupiny
srovnáńım těchto hodnot pro experimentálńı a kontrolńı skupiny ve výchoźım
a následuj́ıćım obdob́ı před a po reformě.
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Topic characteristics Last 20 years have brought a worldwide effort to im-
prove tax collection, prevent tax evasions and possibly also increase labour
force participation and employment. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, many
European countries, especially the former communist ones in Central and East-
ern Europe, have adopted various forms of flat rate income tax reform, inspired
by optimal tax theory and practice in different countries. Since the introduc-
tion in the Baltic States of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia in the mid-1990s,
several countries followed suit, including Russia (2001), Serbia and Ukraine
(2003), Slovakia (2004), Georgia and Romania (2005), Iceland, Macedonia and
Albania (2007), the Czech Republic and Bulgaria (2008), Bosnia (2009), Hun-
gary (2011) and Poland (2013) (Peichl, 2013).
Since January 1st, 2008, the Czech Republic has adopted a new tax system
that may be at best characterized as a “modified flat tax” compared to the
flat tax as defined by Hall & Rabushka (1995). It has some features of a
broad-based income tax, and some features of neutral or consumed-income
tax (Hrbek 2012). It is not a true flat tax for a number of reasons: several
exemptions, double taxation of corporate and individual income, and tax bias
against income saved as opposed to income used for consumption. The new
personal income tax rate has been set at 15%, replacing the old system of four
rates (12%, 19%, 25%, and 32%). However, the amount of income subject
to tax has increased to include social security contributions (SSC) that were
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formerly deductible. This makes the 15% tax rate equivalent to a rate of 22.4%
on the net wage that was taxable under the old system (Hrbek 2012).
In the proposed research we plan to exploit the exogenous change in effective
marginal and average tax rates created by above described tax reform as a
form of natural experiment and identify its effect on labour supply elasticity
of various population subgroups at the intensive and extensive margin. We
will try to compare our findings with the outcomes from similar studies on
other countries, with focus on labour force participation across countries with
different tax rates.
Along the intensive margin, a tax reform which changes the marginal net
wage induces employees to adjust their working hours. At the same time, it
may create extensive responses by affecting the incentive to participate in the
labour market. This effect is likely to be particularly relevant for certain sub-
groups of the population such as married females, single mothers, low-educated
individuals, the young and the elderly. For these individuals, higher tax bur-
dens may make it worthwhile to leave the labour market entirely (Eissa et al.
2008). A central finding of the modern empirical labour literature is that la-
bour supply responses tend to be concentrated more along the extensive margin
- labour force participation than along the intensive margin - working hours
(Eissa & Liebman 1996; Meyer & Rosenbaum 2001). We will focus on confirm-
ing these findings by our own analysis using the data and evidence from the
Czech Republic.
Hypotheses
1. Hypothesis #1: Marginal tax rates changed significantly and differently
for various population subgroups
2. Hypothesis #2: Employment rates of low-income workers has changed
significantly due to the reform
3. Hypothesis #3: Workers across population subgroups adjusted their work-
ing hours
Methodology First, we will analyse the data statistically to identify the pre-
vailing patterns. Specifically, we are interested in basic indicators of different
labour force groups’ attachment in the selected European countries such as
participation rates, employment rates, hours worked and occupational alloc-
ation. While this type of aggregate information is available on the Eurostat
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webpage, we will need individual level data to produce more detailed statistics
– separately for men and women without and with children, differentiated by
age, education and income level. This will supplement the available aggregate
statistics.
Next, we will turn to the econometric analysis to formally determine the
relationship between effective tax rates change and labour supply responses of
workers in the Czech Republic and other countries of interest. The approach
proposed to be used in this paper is based on the standard econometric methods
for panel data and identification strategies frequently used in related studies,
more specifically difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity design
(Eissa & Liebman (1996); Duncan & Peter (2010); Saez et al. (2012)). As the
baseline the basic panel data methods such as pooled regression, fixed/random
effects model (for labour market status) might be used. To obtain robust res-
ults we will apply difference-in-differences analysis (to compare hours worked
and employment status before and after the reform) and regression discon-
tinuity design (to compare individuals from different subgroups around certain
arbitrarily given marginal tax rate threshold).
We will try to identify the control and treatment groups needed to employ
these methods based on after-reform reported hours because a taxpayer ex-
periencing no or negligible change in the marginal tax rate should not have
behavioural response to the pre-reform tax rate threshold. Since the design
of the Czech reform does not provide a clean comparison group by keeping
the same marginal tax rate for the lowest tax brackets we plan to calculate the
effective tax rate in order to be able to sort households into treatment and com-
parison groups. This analysis will identify potential labour supply responses
along its intensive and extensive margins.
Microdata in which we observe labour supply for individuals in households
are necessary to conduct this study, as we want to compare various popula-
tion subgroups. We need to observe individual labour force status (employed,
unemployed, out of labour force), occupation if employed, demographic charac-
teristics (age, gender), family status (married, single, children), education level
and the labour force status and occupation in the previous year. To get this
sensitive and publicly unavailable data, we have already sent the proposal to
the Eurostat and are currently waiting for the reply.
Master’s Thesis Proposal xiv
Expected Contribution The main goal of the thesis is to estimate individual
and households responses to Czech 2008 flat rate personal income tax reform,
as measured by labour supply elasticity and thus contribute to ongoing public
debate about optimal tax policy. In contrast with most of the previously pub-
lished studies on the topic in the Czech Republic, that are predominantly of
descriptive character and deal mostly with the changes in income, our aim is to
quantify the effects of the exogenous change in marginal tax rates on different
population subgroups, more specifically their labour market participation and
hours of work. Employing various econometric methods suitable for microeco-
nomic panel data, namely difference-in-differences approach, fixed effects model
and/or regression discontinuity design, we hope to get consistent and efficient
estimates to appropriately evaluate the success and impacts of the chosen fiscal
policy compared to its objectives regarding the labour supply.
Outline
1. Introduction and Motivation: although the flat tax reforms are adopted
mainly to simplify the framework and reduce tax evasions of high-income
earners, they have also considerable impact on overall employment and
time spent at work.
2. Related studies: we will briefly discuss how others estimate the effect of
change in personal income taxation on labour supply elasticity.
3. Data: we will explain what kind of micro-data we use, describe the stat-
istical properties and discuss their appropriation.
4. Methods: we will introduce the suitable micro-econometric panel data
methods, such as difference-in-differences approach, regression discon-
tinuity design, and other possible identification strategies and estimation
procedures using the exogenous change in marginal tax rates as a natural
experiment.
5. Results: we will discuss the outcomes of our baseline regressions and
robustness checks.
6. Concluding Remarks: we will summarize our findings and their implica-
tions for economic policy and future research.
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5. Kaĺı̌sková, K.(2014): “Labor supply consequences of family taxation: Evidence from
the Czech Republic.” Labour Economics 30(0): pp. 234–244.
6. Kleven, H. J. & C. T. Kreiner (2006): “The marginal cost of public funds: Hours
of work versus labor force participation.” Journal of Public Economics 90(10-11):
pp. 1955–1973.
7. Saez, E., M. Matsaganis, P. Tsakloglou (2012): “Earnings determination and
taxes: Evidence from a cohort based payroll tax reform in Greece.” Quarterly Journal




One of the commonly studied questions many economists all over the world
are trying to answer is how the interaction between changes in taxes and social
benefits is affecting households’ decisions regarding their labour supply. Be-
cause of many factors, which can affect the labour force preferences in several
possible ways, to isolate the effect of interest as causal, the rigorous research
design has to be implemented.
One can conclude that economic agents in the Czech Republic has already
accustomed to the frequent legislative tax and welfare system changes. The
relevant laws are changing at least partially almost every year. Optimists may
believe the objectives of these revisions are not only due to political affiliation
or raising the election potential, but also in order to simultaneously increase tax
revenues and standard of living, to achieve redistributive goals, and to promote
economic growth.
In the years 2007 and 2008 the former Czech right-wing government adopted
the most extensive reforms in both social welfare system and particularly in tax
schedule since the Velvet Revolution in 1989 and establishing the independent
Czech Republic after the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993. Beside numerous
changes in eligibility for social benefits based on new definitions of minimum
living standard and material need in 2007, as the major part of the reform
should be considered the comprehensive revision of the whole taxation scheme
coming into effect at the beginning of 2008, which included adoption of flat
personal income tax rate together with substantial change in the respective tax
base, increase of value-added tax rate and other consumption-based taxes, or
reduction of corporate income tax rate.
The objective of this thesis is to appropriately analyse especially the impact
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of changes induced by personal income tax reform, which is exploited as a nat-
ural experiment, on labour supply elasticity along the intensive and extensive
margins. Hence social welfare system is indeed usually focusing on the bottom
end of the income distribution in general, it can create various unemployment
traps and disincentives regarding the labour force participation and possible
working hours readjustment. As many authors previously pointed out, the
Czech social benefits system is targeting mainly families with children rather
than poor per se (Dušek et al. 2013a). Therefore one can expect the greatest
effect on low-income households, single mothers, low-skilled workers, and sim-
ilar population subgroups. Nevertheless, we have decided to focus our analysis
on single-member households, because of more straightforward approach and
less distortions caused by other household members income or family oriented
social benefits.
In order to isolate the outcome of interest, we are applying a widely used
econometric approach known as “difference-in-differences”. To use this tech-
nique, the appropriate treatment and control groups has to be identified. For
the approach to be valid, two identification assumptions are required. First,
in the absence of any treatment (without changes in tax-benefits policy), the
trends in the labour supply of treatment and control groups would have been
the same. The second assumption demands no substantial difference in the
treatment and control groups compositions before and after policy adoption.
Since we consider a significant change in effective tax rates as a treatment here,
our control group is a part of population with no or negligible change in these
rates.
Data used for identifying both groups, computing effective tax rates and
conducting difference-in-differences based regression analysis itself are taken
from European Labour Force Survey (LFS) and provided by Eurostat. The
relevant period for estimating the treatment effect is set to 2006-2009, because
of variety of underlying policy changes reasons and to better capture the trend
path for both treatment and comparison groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. chapter 2 provides a broad
review of relevant studies on more or less related topics. chapter 3 familiarizes
reader with the Czech tax and benefits reforms between 2006-2009, conduct
a brief descriptive analysis and carries out a simple microsimulation of newly
adopted tax reform and its consequence for change in effective tax rates for
the selected model household. chapter 4 concisely introduces microeconomic
theory of individual labour supply with focus on the net wage rate change
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influence on budget set, utility, and optimal labour supply decisions of economic
agents. Data description, together with descriptive statistics, and overview
of methods to be used, including their underlying assumptions, association
to economic theory with possible advantages, drawbacks and weaknesses, and
offering of additional approaches for robustness check can be found in chapter 5.
In chapter 6 we present the results of the research with in-depth analysis and
interpretation. The last section, chapter 7, summarizes our findings about
significance of tax reform on labour supply elasticity and answers whether the




2.1 Taxes and Labour Supply: Emprical Approach
2.1.1 In-Work Benefits in Work
There is wide scope of literature trying to evaluate effects of tax and trans-
fers on the welfare and labour force responses. Probably the most cited and
recognised papers are those from Eissa, N. and Blundell, R.. Dozens of them
are focused on empirical analysis of adopted tax reforms on labour supply of
various population subgroups.
The labour supply of married women is examined in Eissa (1995) using Tax
Reform Act of 1986 in the US as a natural experiment. The main finding is a
substantial increase of working hours of high-income married women. Several
other both authors’ works look at the in-work-benefits encouraging the low-
income households to participate in the labour market, such as Earned Income
Tax Credit (Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)) in the US (Eissa) or Work-
ing Families’ Tax Credit (Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC)) in the UK
(Blundell).
The impact of the former mentioned welfare program was a number of times
analysed and reviewed in Eissa & Hoynes (1998; 2004; 2006) concentrating
mostly on the labour supply of married couples, while Eissa & Liebman (1996)
tried to find a significant difference between labour supply of single women
with children and single women without children. Eissa (1996) reviews the
lessons that emerged from the 1980s changes in the U.S. tax code and income
distribution, focusing primarily on the labour supply response and examining
whether the dramatic responses in taxable income over the 1980s are due to an
increase in males’ labour market participation.
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More recently, in Eissa et al. (2006; 2008) there are four tax reforms in the
US, and more generally tax policy and labour market performance studied, re-
spectively. Both works possess complex theoretical specification of the labour
supply while pointing out several weaknesses in approaches of earlier studies
stressing distinguishing between intensive and extensive margin of labour sup-
ply elasticity.
On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, R. Blundell has been focusing on
similar topics based on the tax and welfare programs changes in the UK, while
developing and reviewing various evaluation methods of policy interventions;
for the recent work, see e.g. Blundell & Dias (2009).
Some of the earlier works were trying to look at alternative and flexible
labour supply specifications from different angles (Blundell & Meghir 1986;
Blundell et al. 1998) in order to satisfy both theoretical and statistical assump-
tions for reasonable policy analysis assessment.
Later on, he published articles addressing econometric methods suitable
for estimating labour supply using tax reforms (Blundell et al. 1998; Blundell
& Macurdy 1999), examining various social policy reforms mostly in the UK
(Blundell et al. 2000; 2005; Blundell 2006) as well as trying to bring coherent
picture underlying the evolution of labour supply at the extensive and intens-
ive margins in the last forty years in three countries: United-States, United-
Kingdom and France (Blundell et al. 2011).
More recent work “Employment, Hours of Work and the Optimal Taxation
of Low-Income Families” (Blundell & Shephard 2012) analyses the optimal
design of low-income support using a structural labour supply model.
Laroque (2005) studies the optimal tax-subsidy schedules in an economy
where the only decision of the agents is to work, or not, with an application to
the case of France.
Other influential papers are the two by Meyer & Rosenbaum (2001) and
Saez (2002). In the first work, the authors show that a large share of the in-
crease in work by single mothers can be attributed to the EITC and other tax
changes. The latter paper analyses optimal income transfers for low incomes
along the intensive margin and along the extensive margin with carefully cal-
ibrated numerical simulations provided.
There is a bulk of other papers regarding the above described taxes/benefits
and labour supply participation/hours of work responses. Notable and often
cited is Brewer et al. (2006) estimating statistically significant effect of the
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UK in-work benefits program (WFTC) particularly on labour supply of single
mothers.
2.1.2 Looking for Optimal Tax-Benefits Balance
Domeij & Flodén (2006) argue that assumptions underlying previous econo-
metric estimates of the labour supply elasticity are inconsistent and downward
biased with incomplete-markets economies, especially due to ignoring the bor-
rowing constraints. Similar findings are described also in Keane & Rogerson
(2012), where they claim that conventional wisdom of quite low labour supply
elasticity does not hold up to empirically reasonable and relevant extensions of
simple life-cycle models.
Other works of Keane include survey on labour supply and taxes 2011 and
estimating elasticity when participating in multiple welfare programs (Keane
& Moffitt 1998). Moffitt (2002) alone also reviews the economic research on
this topic, covering both the theoretical models that have been developed as
well as the empirical findings from econometric studies on the effects of existing
welfare programs on labour supply.
Kleven & Kreiner (2006) try to measure the marginal cost of public funds to
account for labour force participation responses, motivated by the consensus
in the empirical literature that extensive (participation) responses are more
important than intensive (hours of work) responses. On the contrary Rogerson
& Wallenius (2009) find that changes in taxes have large aggregate effects on
hours of work and assume no inconsistency between this result and the empirical
finding of small labour elasticities for prime age workers.
Kumar (2008; 2012) applies non-parametric estimation with non-linear budget
sets to estimate female labour supply elasticities using data on married women
from the 1985 and 1989 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, exploit-
ing the substantial variation in budget sets caused by the Tax Reform Act of
1986 in the US as a source of identification.
Slemrod (2001) generalizes the standard model of how taxes affect the
labour-leisure choice by allowing individuals to change both their labour supply
and avoidance effort in response to tax changes.
Two very recent papers from Kaĺı̌sková (2014) and Kabátek et al. (2014)
examine joint taxation of the families on labour supply and houseworks sim-
ultaneously in the Czech Republic and France, respectively. Former work is
exploiting introducing of joint taxation of married couples using difference-in-
2. Literature Review 7
differences method, while the latter is more oriented on estimating complex
structural equations.
2.2 Flat Tax: From Theory to Reality
2.2.1 Microsimulations and Theoretical Studies
Next part of this overview is dedicated to a number flat tax reforms analysing
papers with rather broad range of topics. A large portion of works is focusing
on “what if” scenarios, i.e. simulations of flat tax reform adoption and its
impact on various economic variables, including items such as labour market,
income distribution or inequality.
Ventura (1999) quantitatively explores the general equilibrium implications
of a revenue neutral tax reform in which tax structure in the U.S. is replaced
by a flat tax, concluding an equity-efficiency trade-off.
Aaberge et al. (2000) employ a microeconometric framework to examine
the labour supply responses and the welfare effects from replacing the then tax
systems in Italy, Norway and Sweden by a flat tax on total income. The flat
tax rates are determined so that the tax revenues are equal to the revenues as
of 1992.
Fuest et al. (2008) use a simulation model to analyse the effects of revenue
neutral flat rate tax reforms on equity and efficiency for the case of Germany
and find that a flat rate tax with a low tax rate and a low basic allowance yields
positive static welfare effects amounting to approximately 1.8% of income tax
revenue but increases income inequality.
Similarly, Paulus & Peichl (2009) estimate the potential distributional im-
pact of various flat taxes for selected Western European countries and show
that the specific flat tax design and the welfare state regime play a key role.
Jacobs et al. (2007) assess the attractiveness of such a flat tax in achieving
redistributive objectives with the least cost to labour market performance by
applying general equilibrium model for the Netherlands and find it less efficient
regarding these goals.
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2.2.2 How Flat is Actually “Flat Tax?”: Descriptive Evid-
ence
Other part of the sample rather deals with empirical analysis, stylized facts
and descriptive evidence. This is the case particularly for Central and Eastern
European countries, which adopted more or less similar “flat tax” reform to
the one proposed by Hall & Rabushka (1995).
Several of the recent analyses focus on Russia. Ivanova et al. (2005) as well
as Gorodnichenko et al. (2008) examine the effects of Russia’s 2001 flat rate
income tax reform on consumption, income, and tax evasion. Both collectives
find that large and significant increase in personal income tax revenue, hence
changes in tax evasion following the flat tax reform are associated with changes
in voluntary compliance and cannot be explained by changes in tax enforcement
policies.
Work similar to Gorodnichenko’s was written by Hrbek (2012) trying to
evaluate these effects for the Czech flat tax reform.
Duncan & Peter (2010) exploit the exogenous change in marginal tax rates
created by the Russian flat tax reform of 2001 to identify the effect of taxes
on the labour supply of men and women. The main regression results indicate
that the tax reform led to a statistically significant increase in hours of work
for men but had no effect on work hours for women, however, with a positive
response to tax changes in both tails of the female working hours distribution.
The study of Easterbrook (2008) examines how flat taxes have affected
labour supply in eight Central and Eastern European countries, where they
have been adopted by analysing a structural relationship among key variables,
with results varying throughout the sample.
Staehr (2008) presents estimates of the employment and welfare effects of
personal labour income taxation in Estonia. Economic incentives are found to
affect the participation decisions of individuals, but not the number of hours
worked of individuals already working. Surprisingly, the participation elasticit-
ies are higher for individuals in the middle income groups than for individuals
in the low and high income groups.
The rest of the studies has more descriptive and observational nature, see
e.g. Brook & Leibfritz (2005) for Slovakia, Duncan (2012) for Russia, and
Keen et al. (2008) or Peter et al. (2009) for large international comparison.
Interestingly, majority of authors mentioned in this section are considering the
tax schemes in most of the studied countries at best as “modified flat tax”.
Chapter 3
Tax-Benefits System in the Czech
Republic
The Czech economy provides a unique opportunity to study the impact of vari-
ous fiscal and social policies on labour market dynamics. The unemployment
rate have been extraordinarily low not only in regional comparison, but also
regarding the most European and OECD member countries. This figure, how-
ever, has been fluctuating from 4.3% (1994, 2008) to around 8% (2003, 2010)
(see Figure 3.1), thus there occurred a considerable change within our period of
interest (2006-2010). It is interesting to investigate, to what extent it might be
a consequence of interaction of changes in effective tax rates due to complex tax
reform with “generous” social welfare system increasing the reservation wages
of the particular population subgroups (Galuščák & Pavel 2012).
3.1 The Czech Modified Flat Tax
Since January 1st, 2008, the Czech Republic implemented substantial reform
of taxation system, and the one of social benefits a year earlier. One of the
crucial steps within this process was an adoption of the flat personal income
tax rate that may be at best described as a “modified flat tax” compared to
the flat tax as defined by Hall & Rabushka (1995) as it is not a classical flat
expenditure tax with one marginal rate, but a one-rate tax on personal income.
In practice, however, multiple marginal effective tax rates still remained due
to the substantially extended tax credits, the social security contributions and
the means-tested social benefits (Dalsgaard 2008). As Hrbek (2012) states, the
tax “[h]as some features of a broad-based personal income tax (PIT), and some
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Figure 3.1: Unemployment Rate in Percentage (1994-2014)
Source: Eurostat (2014)
features of neutral or consumed-income tax”(p. 16). It is not a true flat tax due
to number of reasons: several exemptions and allowances, double taxation of
corporate and individual income, and tax bias against income saved as opposed
to income used for consumption.
3.1.1 Personal Income Tax Reform
The personal income tax rate has been set at 15%, replacing the old progress-
ive system of four rates (12%, 19%, 25%, and 32%) with low effective tax
rates based on a lower level of redistribution than in all neighbouring countries
(Jarass & Obermair 2000). The statutory figures can be found in Table 3.1.
The most important difference to previous taxation scheme was the introduc-
tion of flat tax rate at direct labour costs, i.e. adding employer’s social security
contributions (SSCs) (which are equivalent to 35% of gross salary) to the gross
salary itself, giving final amount of income subject to tax.1 This makes the
15% tax rate roughly equivalent to a rate slightly below 23% on the net wage
that was taxable prior to the reform adoption (Hrdlička et al. 2010).
In order to compensate low-income individuals for increasing their marginal
tax rate, the reform extensively broadened tax credits, including the personal
tax credit, the tax credit for non-earning spouse and the tax credit for children
among others. These changes effectively avoided increase in tax burden on those
1This is sometimes referred to as super-gross salary.
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Table 3.1: Statutory PIT Rates in 2007 and 2008 for Incomes in CZK
2007 Base over But not over Tax Liability Of the Amount over
0 121,200 12% -
121,200 218,400 14,544 + 19% 121,200
218,400 331,200 33,012 + 25% 218,400
331,200 and more 61,212 + 35% 331,200
2008 Base over But not over Tax Liability Of the Amount over
0 and more 15% -
previously taxed at rates below 23%, cut the average tax rates significantly for
most of the tax payers, hence resulting in relatively high tax-exempt threshold
so even the single earner without children enters the PIT net when earning
about 45% of average wage. An example of much more vulnerable single payer
with 2 children is a no tax liability until at about 130% of national average
wage (Hrdlička et al. 2010). For better notion we indicate the size of main tax
credits in both pre-reform and after-reform periods in Table 3.2.




Child, disabled 18,000 32,040
Spouse, non-earning 4,200 24,840
Spouse, disabled 8,400 49,680
Partial disability pension 1,500 2,520
Full disability pension 3,000 5,040
Disabled 9,600 16,140
Student 2,400 4,020
We find also suitable to mention here that if after subtracting applied corres-
ponding credits the computed income tax was negative, the actual tax liability
was zero. The only exception were the children credits, when earner effectively
paid negative income tax, if applicable. The previously widely used joint taxa-
tion of couples with children introduced in 2005 was abolished (Kaĺı̌sková 2014);
there is little advantage of it under a flat-rate PIT, and as already mentioned,
the tax credit for non- or little earning spouse was markedly elevated.
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3.1.2 Social Security Contributions
Another important feature of the newly adopted tax system was introduction
of a cap on income subject to SSCs at four times the average wage, which
was about CZK 1,089,168 per year in 2008, thus only relevant to those with
monthly earnings above CZK 90,000, which constituted only around 1.8% of the
Czech dependent earners at the time. The already existing ceiling for the self-
employed was raised to the same level (Dalsgaard 2008). Any excessive income
on top of mentioned yearly amount was subject only to 15% tax rate without
applying the “super-gross” method and therefore substantially reducing the
effective average tax rates for the very right tail of earnings distribution. Since
it affects only a negligible part of earners, it is unlikely to have much impact
on labour supply decisions (Hrdlička et al. 2010).
The SSCs themselves were constituted from two parts for full-time employed
people. Their rates did not change from 2007 to 2008, however they negligibly
changed in 2009 (decrease by 1% for employer and 1.5% for employee): social
insurance contributions (paid as 8% from gross wage by employee and as 26% by
employer) and health insurance contributions (paid as 4.5% from gross wage by
employee and as 9% by employer). For people with declarable taxable income
less than the minimum wage the mandatory health insurance contributions
were based on the full-time workers’ minimum-wage payments, unless they
were taking care of children, receiving living allowance or actively looking for
a job, if unemployed. This could be effectively considered as a disincentive for
part-time employment, while availability of such jobs is limited in the Czech
Republic (Tang & Cousins 2005).
3.1.3 Changes in Other Tax Rates
Another part of tax reform was also a cut in the statutory corporate income tax
(CIT) rate from 24% in 2007 to 21% in 2008. All withholding taxes on capital
returns were unified at a 15% rate, the lowest possible under EU regulations
(Hrdlička et al. 2010). The lower rate of value added tax (VAT) applied to
a range of basic goods and services rose from 5 to 9% in order to offset the
revenue losses resulting of the changes to the PIT and CIT. The second standard
19 percent rate was maintained.
3. Tax-Benefits System in the Czech Republic 13
3.1.4 Effect of the Reform on Effective Tax Rates
Hrdlička et al. (2010) and Dalsgaard (2008) agree that the reform intended to
promote growth and employment by simplifying the tax system, cutting tax
rates while expanding tax bases, and partially shifting the tax burden from
income to consumption. I addition to that, government argued the changes
would strengthen the incentives for labour-market activation. Nevertheless,
since there was simultaneously adopted another extensive reform of social be-
nefits, this claim is rather disputable. More generous tax and benefits system
can be viewed as more equitable, on the other hand, it can create substan-
tial unemployment traps and disincentives to increase earnings (Hrdlička et al.
2010).
Dušek et al. (2013b) computed that “some low-income taxpayers face ef-
fective marginal tax rates between 50% and 90%. About 2% of taxpayers are
exposed to effective MTRs exceeding 60%. These taxpayers face positive with-
drawals of benefits if their earnings increase” (p. 489). Similar conclusions can
be found also in Hrdlička et al. (2010) or in Dalsgaard (2008). These credits
and social benefits are meant to induce progressive elements into the flat-tax
scheme but they aim primarily at households with children rather than poor
per se (Dušek et al. 2013b) and act as a barrier to labour supply of single
parents and low-income families (Dalsgaard 2008).
3.2 Social Welfare Reform
The change in social welfare began already in 2007, when so called “minimum
living standard” (MLS) measure stopped being automatically indexed to living
costs. The lower “subsistence minimum” as a sanction for people inactive
in employment searching was introduced. Beside significantly extended tax
credits that were already mentioned, there was instituted a new form of housing
allowance, based on “common housing costs”, together with another type of
living allowance, housing supplement, and broadened support in material need.
The process further continued in 2008 by revisions of both parental and child
allowances. The former one introduced optional period of drawing down up
to full amount in the range 2-4 years, while the latter unified the eligibility
threshold from previous three rates to the single level of 2.4 time MLS, thus
reducing a number of drawing households.
To summarize the above written, both the tax liability and the average tax
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rate deteriorates considerably with increasing number of children in a house-
hold. This is primarily because of relatively large tax credit per child. Let us
recall this is the only tax credit that can actually become tax bonus, i.e. if
it is greater than tax liability, applying parent effectively pays negative taxes.
Furthermore, the payments such as child allowance, parental allowance, birth
grant, and maternity benefit are linked to the children in a family, so other
households obtain transfers only in case of need (very low income or perhaps
low income in combination with higher housing costs than affordable).
As Dušek et al. (2013a) computed, over 50 percent of families with children
receive some benefits contrary to only quarter of childless households. In terms
of household income, for the former group, on average 34 percent of it come from
social transfers, while this figure is only about 5 percent for the latter group.
Therefore it is reasonable to expect that low- to moderate-income households
with several children will have excessively high effective marginal tax rates at
the points of social benefits withdrawal, operating as disincentives for active
labour market participation mostly in the case of non-working spouses.
3.2.1 The Main Changes in Tax-Benefits System (2006-2009)
 Since 2008, Personal Income Tax (PIT) rates unified from previous four
rates (12%, 19%, 25%, and 35%) to a single rate of 15%.
 Social Security Contributions (SSC) stayed at the same levels for both
employees and employers (12.5% and 35% respectively) until 2009, when
they negligibly decreased (to 11% and 34%).
 In 2008 subject to a PIT changed from gross income to super-gross income,
hence making effective tax wedge considerably higher than the statutory
rate of 15%.
 The ceiling on SSCs was introduced, decreasing both effective marginal
and average tax rates for 1.8% of the top earners.
 Tax credits were extensively enlarged together with PIT reform; joint
taxation of married couples was abolished.
 Corporate Income Tax (CIT) rate was lowered from 24% to 21%, while
lower Value-Added Tax (VAT) rate increased from 5% to 9%.
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 Definition of Minimum Living Standard (MLS) was substantially changed
in 2007 and became just a simple sum of household members MLSs. It
stopped to consist of two parts and ceased to be automatically indexed
to living costs, for example excluding accommodation expenditures.
 Housing allowance was largely expanded since 2007, it was, however, no
more related to MLS, rather it regarded the “normative” housing costs
associated with the urbanization level of the living place and a number
of household members.
 Child allowance eligibility incomes increased from 1.1; 1.8; and 3.0 times
MLS in 2006 to 1.5; 2.4; and 4.0 times MLS, to be unified at 2.4 times MLS
in 2008 and further slightly increased to 2.5 times MLS in 2009.
 Parental allowance sharply grew from 3,696 CZK per month in 2006 to
7,582 CZK per month in 2007, with an option to choose the overall period
of drawing in 2008.
3.3 Simulated Impact of PIT reform on ETRs
In this part of the paper we try to quantitatively and graphically show the
effect of changes in effective marginal and average tax rates induced by adopted
tax and social welfare reforms by carrying out a simple microsimulation for a
particular type of households.
The simplest household consists of a single person without children, thus not
eligible for almost any social benefits unless with very low income. Comparison
of average and marginal income tax rates for such a household before and after
the reform can be observed in Figure 3.2.
Units of X axis are multiples of average wage in particular year, while on
Y axis are tax rates measured in percentage points. X axis is restricted by
triple of average wage to avoid mixing up individuals affected by SSC ceiling.
Moreover, as Hrdlička et al. (2010) points out people earning more than 4
times average wage constitute only about 1.8% of all employees. Since SSC
didn’t change except for the mentioned case of a very few top earners, who
are not in the figure, only PIT rates are considered here. The similar figure for
overall tax wedge with social security contribution incorporated can be found
in the Appendix A.
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Figure 3.2: Marginal and Average Income Tax Rates for a One-Person
Household
Source: Author’s computations (2015)
From the figure it is obvious that elevated personal tax credit substantially
increased tax-exempt income threshold, at which the single earner without
children enters into PIT net, from 24 to around 43% of the average wage.2
Marginal tax rates important for labour supply decision decreased by 12% for
this part of the income distribution. The similar case occurred at the opposite
end in an income range of around 1.3 to 4 times average wage, where marginal
income tax rates decreased by about 9.2%. Only relatively minor changes come
about in ranges of 0.45 to 0.85 and 0.85 to 1.3 times average wage, where MTRs
rose by 3.8% and decreased by 2.2% respectively. The previous paragraph is
summarized in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Changes in Marginal Tax Rates
Income Range Change in MTR
0.00 - 0.23 0%
0.23 - 0.45 -12%
0.45 - 0.85 +3.8%
0.85 - 1.30 -2.2%
1.30 - 4.00 -9.2%
2For other types of households this threshold is shifted more to the right, due to sub-
stantially broadened child and non-working spouse tax credits, nonetheless, the marginal tax
rate of 22.8% (as it would be under the old tax system) remains the same once entering the
PIT net.
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Since the most of the social benefits are targeted on the families with chil-
dren (Dušek et al. 2013a), we further focus our analysis on the single-member
households, whose labour supply decisions shouldn’t be distorted by other
household members income and family-based social benefits.
Chapter 4
Individual Labour Supply Theory
Each healthy and able adult person must decide whether to work and once
employed, how many hours to spend at job. This part of the paper describes
basic framework usually used in various labour supply studies – the neoclassical
model of labour supply choice.
4.1 The Utility Function
The model is based on microeconomic worker’s preference theory. It assumes
that both leisure and consumption are goods, so the consumer prefers more of
each. Individual preferences are usually represented by utility function in the
form
U = f(C,L), (4.1)
where C denotes consumption and L denotes leisure. This function trans-
forms various combinations of both goods into an index that measures the level
of satisfaction – utility. It is generally accepted that different combinations of
leisure and consumption can lead to the same level of utility. An aggregation of
such points forms indifference curves illustrating the same level of utility with
well defined properties:
1. Indifference curves are downward sloping. As both consumption and
leisure are goods, if we get more of one, we must lower the other to keep
the level of utility constant.
2. Higher indifference curves represent combinations of more leisure and
more consumption, thus indicating higher levels of utility.
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3. Indifference curves do not intersect in order to keep preferences rational.
4. If we are ever to observe the allocation of time between work and leisure,
the indifference curves must be convex to origin. This is equivalent to
decreasing marginal utility property.
4.2 The Budget Constraint
The consumption and leisure are bounded by person’s time and income. Frac-
tion of the income may be independent of hours worked. It is known as “non-
labour” or “unearned income”, say V . Denote h the hours of work and w the
hourly wage rate. The budget constraint can be then written as:
C = wh+ V, (4.2)
thus the aggregate consumption must be equal to the sum of earned plus
non-labour incomes. A worker has two options how to use their time: work or
leisure. Let be T a total number of hours available in a period. Then T = h+L,
and we can rewrite the budget set:
C = w(T − L) + V = (wT + V )− wL, (4.3)
where the last form of the equation is in fact a line representation with
the slope of the negative wage rate. The budget line is easy to graph (see
Figure 4.1), since in this static model we assume a constant wage rate for every
hour worked and no savings. Even if the person decides not to work at all,
such that T = L, she can still afford to consume V amount of goods. The
combination of consumption and leisure, when person doesn’t work is called
endowment point.
4.3 The Hours of Work Decision
Workers choose such a combination of leisure–consumption that maximizes
their utility U given their budget constraint. Because the person can always
achieve the higher indifference curve, if the current one is crossing the budget
line, and simultaneously, the indifference curves above the budget line are not
affordable, this utility maximization is gained at the point, where the budget
line is tangent to the indifference curve, hence their slopes are equal, i.e. the
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ratio of marginal utilities—marginal rate of substitution—of leisure and con-




Figure 4.1: The Labour-Leisure Decision
Source: Borjas (2005)
4.3.1 The Impact of Change in Income
If only the non-labour income changes, while keeping the wage rate constant,
the budget line shifts parallel to the original one. For example after an increase
worker can achieve higher indifference curve, and thus is necessarily better off.
The new combination of consumption and leisure depends, whether they are
normal or inferior goods1. If we reasonably assume they are normal, then the
income effect—as the impact of this change is called—increases consumption
1Assumptions we made so far imply only one can be possibly inferior—it depends on the
utility function—both can, however, be normal and they empirically usually are.
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and reduces hours of work. In other words, substantial change in non-labour
income (along with changes in preferences) may cause a shift in an individual
labour supply curve (McConnell et al. 2003), see section 4.5.
If the wage rate changes, the situation is, however, more complicated. The
budget line rotates around endowment point, but the net impact of the wage
rate change is ambiguous. If wage increase, the budget set expands and worker
has more opportunities. This should increase demand for all normal goods,
including leisure. On the other hand, it also makes leisure more expensive.
These two contradicting forces are crucial in determining what will be the final
combination of factors. One is an already discussed income effect.
The latter opposite force with the negative sign is known as substitution
effect, when after the wage growth the first leg of income effect impact takes
place, the economic agent “moves” along the new indifference curve and re-
duces hours of leisure in favour of work, to compensate for more expensive
leisure, keeping the income constant. The net outcome depends on the relative
strengths of the effects as illustrated at Figure 4.2 and implicitly is defining
wage elasticity of labour supply, see section 4.6.
Figure 4.2: Decomposition of Wage Change into Income and Substi-
tution Effects
Source: Borjas (2005)
4.4 The Labour Force Participation Decision
The decision of work depends on so called reservation wage. It gives the wage
rate that would make a person indifferent between remaining at the endowment
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point and starting to work. Individual will not work if the offered wage is less
than the reservation wage (she cannot get more utility than when not working
under such a wage) and vice versa, the person will enter the labour market if
the offered wage exceeds the reservation wage.
The reservation wage level depends on many factors, such as taste for work
or if the leisure is a normal good. Holding the reservation wage constant,
increase in the market wage rate increases the labour force participation. The
difference to subsection 4.3.1 is that income effect is generated only if the
person is already working. If not, the rise of the wage rate has no effect on
their real income, but simply makes leisure more expensive, thus making them
more likely to start working.
4.5 The Labour Supply Curve
The labour supply curve represents relation between hours of work and the wage
rate. Figure 4.3 shows how individual labour supply curve can be obtained from
the utility-maximization problem previously discussed.
The left panel illustrates optimal consumption-leisure bundles under several
wage rates. At first, when the wage rate is lower than reservation wage, the
person does not work. After market wage exceeds this threshold, person starts
to work. From the right part of the figure it is obvious that substitution effect
dominates at lower wage rates, while income effect dominates at higher ones.
Because of this, the curve displayed at Figure 4.3 is usually referred to as
backward bending labour supply curve.
4.6 The Labour Supply Elasticity
Responsiveness of hours of work to changes in the wage rate is measured by
the labour supply elasticity defined as:
σ =
percent change in hours of work










The labour supply elasticity represents the percentage change in hours worked
with a one percent change in the wage rate. The sign depends on the labour
supply curve slope. It is positive when substitution effect dominates and negat-
ive when income effect dominates. The greater the absolute value of the labour
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Figure 4.3: Derivation of Individual Labour Supply Curve
Source: Borjas (2005)
supply elasticity, the more the hours of work respond to changes in the wage
rate.
4.6.1 Estimates of The Labour Supply Elasticity
Empirical responses of hours of work have been extensively researched like few
other topics in economics. A typical study in the past was trying to estimate
a model in the form:
hi = βwi + γVi + covariates, (4.6)
with hi being i-th person’s hours of work, wi their wage rate, and Vi non-
labour income. wi and often also hi are usually logarithmically transformed.
Coefficient β represents labour supply elasticity and its sign depends on already
discussed “clash” of income and substitution effects. If beta is negative, income
effects dominate, and vice versa, if positive, substitution effect dominate. There
is almost as many estimates of elasticity as empirical studies, nevertheless, for
men the average is often reported around -0.1, while for women around 0.2, thus
women are more responsive to change in wages and for their labour supply the
substitution effect seem to dominate contrary to the men’s responses (Borjas
2005).
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Nowadays, there are many other approaches of estimating labour supply
responses to the change in the wage rates. They may be structural, static,
dynamic, dealing with many types of obstacles. Many of the related works
using various of these methods are reviewed in chapter 2. One of the popular
methods in the labour economics field used also in this study is referred to
as “natural experiment approach” that often uses “difference-in-differences”
estimator. The approach is exploiting variation in incomes induced by changes
in tax and welfare systems that had impact only on a part of population and
it is discussed in detail in chapter 5. Perhaps it is important to mention that
parameters estimated by this method measure the total response of a policy
change, rather than elasticity per se (Blundell & Macurdy 1999).
Chapter 5
Data Description and Methodology
5.1 Data Description
The data used come from yearly European Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the
Czech Republic for four consecutive years 2006-2009. The years 2006 and 2007
are defined as the pre-reform period here, while 2008 and 2009 are treated as
the post-reform years.
The EU Labour Force Survey is the largest European household sample
survey conducted in the 28 Member States of the European Union, 2 candidate
countries and 3 countries of the European Free Trade Association. At the
moment, the LFS anonymized microdata for scientific purposes contain data for
all Member States in addition to Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. In general,
data for individual countries are available depending on their accession date.
LFS provides quarterly and annual data on labour participation of people
aged 15 and over and on persons outside the labour force. It covers resid-
ents in private households according to labour status. The data can be broken
down according to multiple dimensions including age, sex, educational attain-
ment, and distinctions between permanent/temporary and full-time/part-time
employment. The significant drawback of the survey is unavailability of some
income information. Only since 2009 the income decile for every surveyed
working employee is provided.
For our data private households were sampled annually under the respons-
ibility of the Czech Statistical Office (CZSO), which selected the sample, pre-
pared the questionnaires, conducted the direct interviews among households,
and forwarded the outcomes to Eurostat in accordance with the common coding
scheme.
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5.1.1 Sample Description and Summary Statistics
To keep the analysis straightforward and to avoid further identification diffi-
culties and possible distortions the sample is restricted to one-person house-
holds only. The objects of our interests are people aged 20-60 years reporting
living alone1. Magnitude of impact of the PIT reform on labour supply of these
households is, however, questionable mainly due to well-known issues such as
frictions, hours of work rigidity or inter-temporal substitution.
Despite other subgroups such as single mothers or married women reportedly
respond more to exogenous changes in disposable income, their analysis would
be much more complex and would demand a model on the household level,
where other members incomes and labour decisions together with family ori-
ented social benefits are involved.
Table 5.1: Estimation Sample Summary Statistics: Men
2006 2007 2008 2009
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Participation 0.88 0.32 0.89 0.31 0.90 0.30 0.89 0.31
Unemployed 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.25
Income 20,476 6,877 21,753 7,448 23,612 8,368 23,571 8,074
Age 41.10 11.10 40.81 11.15 40.66 11.20 40.54 11.20
University 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.18 0.38
Married 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27
Sample size 5,764 5,624 5,765 5,854
Table 5.2: Estimation Sample Summary Statistics: Women
2006 2007 2008 2009
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Participation 0.76 0.43 0.79 0.41 0.77 0.42 0.79 0.41
Unemployed 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.23
Income 20,344 7,662 21,319 7,691 23,325 8,320 23,587 8,564
Age 44.83 12.34 43.99 12.48 43.57 12.56 43.40 12.65
University 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.36 0.17 0.37 0.18 0.38
Married 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24
Sample size 4,513 4,602 4,492 4,292
1Although in many studies the prime age starts at 25 years, the reason to start at age 20
is that many workers of this age with (lower) secondary education are already participating
in the labour market in the Czech Republic.
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Basic summary statistics for the whole sample of single households can be
found in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. Interesting fact is that around 6% of these
people are married despite they claim to live alone. One can also observe
significantly higher labour force participation for single men than for their
female counterparts, slightly growing share of people with higher education
over the years, and decreasing average age, whereas men tend to be younger.
5.2 Defining Treatment and Control Groups
The data used in the paper is “just” anonymised repeated cross-sections
and not true panel with no income in the data reported, i.e. we cannot track
the same individuals over time (and neither estimate e.g. fixed effect model),
thus it is not possible to divide individuals to treatment and control groups
according to their incomes, which were not part of the survey and secondly,
they were subjects to the tax reform and thus the composition of the groups
created on this basis might change in a non-random way (Duncan & Peter
2010). In addition, incomes are not even observed for individuals out of labour
force and very difficult to approximate in a reasonable way.
Therefore we have to find some other criterion for such an assignment. In
this case the highest attained level of education is used as a proxy for income
and thus approximate belonging of an individual to the particular income range
and associated pre-reform marginal tax rate bracket. As a second grouping
variable is considered cohort, this disaggregation, however, markedly lowers the
sample sizes of the groups, see Table 6.3. As previously analysed, the marginal
tax rates fell considerably especially for the low and high income earners and
changed only negligibly around the mean of the income distribution.
The people with primary and lower secondary education, usually low-skilled
and working in rather low-paid jobs, are taken as the first treatment group. The
labour supply elasticity response, if any, is expected to occur at the extensive
margin (labour force status change).
Nevertheless, given the minimum wage setting at the time, most of the
employees working full time in analysed period had income greater than 0.45
times average Czech wage regardless of their occupation, implying a consider-
able part of the single lower educated experienced only minor change in their
marginal tax rates due to the PIT reform and thus was effectively excluded
from the treatment.
The highly educated individuals with college or university diploma are
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serving as the second treatment group, since most of them are working as
a highly-qualified professionals with above average earnings. On the contrary,
these highly-skilled workers are expected to possibly adjust their labour supply
at the intensive margin (hours of work change) if they can and if their net wage
elasticity is sufficiently high.
Workers with completed upper secondary education are defined as the con-
trol group here. Although they are the largest and most variegated group from
the three, we can assume that on average they are earning income around the
Czech Republic mean or slightly below, due to typical right-skewed earnings
distribution with outliers at the top incomes.
The shares of workers with particular education levels as defined by ISCED
classification are summarized in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Highest Attained Level of Education
Education Men (%) Women (%) Total (%)
No Formal Education 0.05 0.07 0.06
Primary 0.08 0.02 0.05
Lower Secondary 7.13 13.83 10.48
Upper Secondary 1 43.51 28.16 35.84
Upper Secondary 2 31.8 39.31 35.56
Post-Secondary 1.25 2.44 1.85
Tertiary 3 0.75 1.75 1.25
Tertiary 4 14.77 13.73 14.25
Post-Tertiary 0.66 0.69 0.68
Observations 23,004 17,898 40,902
1 vocational, not designed to lead directly to next stage of
education
2 general, designed to provide direct access to further edu-
cation or labour market
3 practically oriented tertiary education (college)
4 theoretically based/research preparatory (university)
Due to lack of observations for some educational levels, to finally construct
the groups of interest we aggregate together people with no formal educa-
tion, primary education and lower secondary education; both categories of up-
per secondary education plus post-secondary non-tertiary education; and finally
both levels of tertiary education plus post-tertiary education. This way we ob-
tain three broader levels of education: low, medium and high summarized in
Table 5.4, which are actually our treatment/control groups as described above.
5. Data Description and Methodology 29
Table 5.4: Groups According to the Education Level
Education Level Men (%) Women (%) Total (%) Observations
Low 7.26 13.92 10.02 4,677
Medium 76.56 69.91 73.80 30,579
High 16.18 16.17 16.18 5,646
Observations 23,004 17,898 40,902
5.2.1 Occupational Choices and Distribution of Income by
Levels of Education
To effectively assess the basic labour market decomposition according to the
levels of education, we present the cross-table of shares of individuals with
certain education levels in rather broad defined occupation groups based on
1-digit ISCO classification codes. In the last column the absolute numbers of
people in every occupation group are stated2.
For example the most common workers in the sample are technicians and
associate professionals, followed by craftsmen, and operators. Table 5.5 also
shows that almost half of low educated in the sample is either inactive or
unemployed according to ILO labour status definition. On the contrary, just
20.5% and 8.7% respectively are not employed among those with medium and
high levels of education.
If the non-working individuals are omitted (the table on the right side), it
is clear that less skilled workers with low level of education largely work as
plant/machine operators or in some of the elementary occupations. A smal-
ler but still considerable part operates in service & sales, and craft & related
trades. People with attained upper secondary education are mostly techni-
cians/associated professionals, craftsmen, plant/machine operators, or work in
service & sales. The most educated group is conclusively dominated by profes-
sionals, followed by technicians and managers.
One can relatively easily assume, which occupations should be highly rewar-
ded in monetary terms and vice versa. For better notion we provide an overview
of incomes by reporting averages of medians of gross wages in business sector
for concrete occupation groups over the examined years in Table 5.6. One can
notice that for many of the occupation groups wages fell in 2009, probably
because of the intensifying economic crisis.
2The figures are different after omitting unemployed and inactive persons because of using
analytical weights.
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Table 5.5: Share of Individuals in Occupation Groups According to
Their Education Level
Education Level Education Level
Occupation Low (%) Middle (%) High (%) Total Low (%) Middle (%) High (%) Total
armed forces 0.00 0.27 0.29 132 0.00 0.34 0.32 128
managers 0.67 3.63 10.44 2,420 1.31 4.57 11.44 2,358
professionals 0.28 3.34 47.51 5,727 0.54 4.21 52.05 5,579
technicians 1.24 18.57 25.40 9,666 2.44 23.35 27.83 9,416
clerical support 1.76 6.37 3.17 2,868 3.45 8.01 3.47 2,793
service and sales 8.09 11.56 2.15 5,114 15.88 14.54 2.36 4,982
agriculture 2.24 0.98 0.40 532 4.40 1.24 0.44 519
craft and related 6.88 17.43 1.09 7,245 13.49 21.92 1.19 7,057
machine operators 14.66 13.22 0.69 5,953 28.76 16.63 0.76 5,799
elementary 15.15 4.14 0.13 2,380 29.72 5.21 0.14 2,319
not employed 49.04 20.47 8.72 11,232 - - - -
Observations 4,960 39,033 9,278 53,271 2,462 30,239 8,249 40,950
These (medians) were imputed from from Information Survey on Average
Earnings conducted quarterly under supervision of the Czech Statistical Office
and Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. The break-down level was chosen
at 1-digit ISCO codes taking into account NUTS 2 regions, where the individuals
live. The drawback of this approach is indeed a great simplification, since the
persons within the same occupation group and region have imputed income
equal regardless of age, sex or education, but at he moment these statistics
were the best available solution.
Table 5.6: Gross Median Wages According to Occupation (in CZK)
Occupation 2006 2007 2008 2009 Observations
armed forces 21,067 22,925 24,606 23,084 119
managers 35,033 37,166 41,392 39,921 1,977
professionals 30,664 31,515 33,898 34,908 4,111
technicians 22,851 23,811 26,066 26,355 7,252
clerical support 16,270 16,688 18,643 19,419 2,008
service and sales 12,357 12,643 13,442 13,917 3,692
agricultural, forestry 14,313 14,916 16,523 15,667 372
craft and related 18,004 18,955 20,402 20,175 5,368
machine operators 17,735 18,357 20,020 19,459 4,632
elementary 12,540 12,742 13,787 13,648 1,828
Observations 7,068 7,634 8,271 8,386 31,359
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In addition to the table we show the effect of education on job market
position and earnings level in Figure 5.1, where there are plots for every year
of the examined period with income deciles of gross median take home pay on
the X axis, and percentage of the sample with particular education level within
these deciles on the Y axis.
Whilst only a tiny fraction of the low educated employees takes home pay
greater than median, the high-skilled workers’ earnings above the 7th decile are
substantially right-skewed. For both of these subgroups there seem to occur
some remarkable shocks to the wages distribution during the reference period.
The comparison group of medium education level individuals has relatively
consistent distribution of income over the years with fractions of workers more
or less evenly divided especially among the first 8 deciles.
Figure 5.1: Monthly Gross Wages Deciles Distribution by Education
Source: Author’s computations (2015)
Since reporting income deciles in Labour Force Survey (LFS) started to be
mandatory from 2009, the similar figure for the years 2009-2011 based on the
income deciles reported directly in the survey can be found in Appendix A.
Hence the reader can compare the relative accuracy of imputed aggregate in-
come statistics with the ones reported by the respondents directly at least for
2009.
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5.3 Difference-in-Differences Estimator
To quantitatively assess the impacts of policies or programs, when random-
ized trials are impossible to conduct, often only the observational data such
as responses to survey questions are available to use. A possible caveats with
these studies, however, is that observations are not randomly assigned to treat-
ment. Statistical approaches used to explore these data are often referred to
as “treatment effects” (ATE) models.
In this part of the thesis, we consider one of the methods for estimating
treatment effects with observational data: the ”difference-in-differences” (DiD)
estimator, which is just a special case of the well-known fixed effects model
(Blundell & Macurdy 1999). We will briefly discuss the DiD model and its
underlying assumptions, and then turn to our topic application: Estimating
effects of PIT reform on labour supply of single-person households.
Since simple comparison of pre- and post-treatment outcomes for the treated
is likely to be contaminated by temporal trends in the outcome variable or by
the effect of events, other than the treatment, the essential reasoning behind
the DiD technique, or the “natural experiment approach”, is to obtain the
treatment effect by estimating the difference between outcome measures at two
time points for both the treatment and the comparison group, which was not
exposed to the treatment and then comparing the difference between the two;
hence the difference-in-differences (Buckley & Shang 2003).
The double differencing effectively rules out any (unobserved) variables con-
stant over time correlated with the selection process and the outcome variable
from affecting the estimation of interest. To achieve this, DiD procedure in-
volves repeated observations of the units. These may not necessarily have a
true panel structure, where data is collected on the same individuals at both
periods, as repeated cross-sections, such as two random survey samples like in
our case, are sufficient, if other assumptions for using this technique hold.
5.3.1 Main Assumptions of the DiD Model
The crucial assumption of the method is that in the absence of treatment the
average change in the outcome is expected to be equal for both the controls and,
as a counterfactual, for treated if they had not participated, i.e. it is presumed
that unmeasured factors, like macroeconomic shocks or other economic policies,
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affect both groups in similar manner. This condition is often referred to as
“common” or “parallel trends”.
Moreover, especially in pseudo-panels like our data, there must not be a
systematic change in composition of treatment and comparison groups with re-
spect to the fixed effect term to ensure before-after comparability. For rich and
comprehensive discussion of these assumptions see Blundell & Dias (2000; 2002;
2009). Abadie (2005) proposes a more technically complex solution that em-
ploys the semi-parametric technique—the propensity score matching, to adjust
the sample, when the “parallel trends” assumption is violated.
One should be aware that beside these identifying assumptions, the DiD
as described here employs the ordinary least squares estimator and, as such,
it is sensitive to the usual violations of the Gauss-Markov theorem (such as
homoscedasticity, normality, and no autocorrelation).
5.3.2 Derivation of the DiD Model
The conventional DiD model here is defined following Abadie (2005). Let Yit be
the outcome of interest for individual i at time t. The population is observed
before policy change at t = 0, and after policy change at t = 1. Between
the two, a part of the population is subject to the treatment. Denote Dit =
1 if individual i has been exposed to the treatment before period t, Dit = 0
otherwise. The participants form the treatment group, while the latter are
controls. Since everyone can be possibly only exposed to treatment after the
first period, Di0 = 0 for all i.
The estimator is usually derived using a linear parametric model like e.g.
in Ashenfelter & Card (1985):
Suppose the outcome variable is generated by a components of
variance process
Yit = δt + γDit + ηi + νit, (5.1)
where δt is a time-specific component, γ represents the impact
of the treatment, ηi is an individual-specific component, and νit is
an individual-transitory shock that has mean zero at each period,
t = 0, 1, and is possibly correlated in time. Only Yit and Dit are
observed. The effect of the treatment, γ, is not identified without
further restrictions. A sufficient condition for identification is that
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selection for treatment does not depend on the individual-transitory
shocks, that is
P (Di1 = 1|νit) = P (Di1 = 1) (5.2)
for t = 0, 1. Adding and subtracting E[ηi|Di1] in (5.1) we obtain
Yit = δt + γDit + E[ηi|Di1] + εit, (5.3)
where εit = ηi−E[ηi|Di1] + νit. Notice that δt = δ0 + (δ1− δ0)t,
and E[ηi|Di1] = E[ηi|Di1 = 0] + (E[ηi|Di1 = 1]−E[ηi|Di1 = 0])Di1.
Let α = E[ηi|Di1 = 0] + δ0, β = E[ηi|Di1 = 1]− E[ηi|Di1 = 0] and
δ = δ1 − δ0.
We obtain:
Yit = α + βDi1 + δ · t+ γDit + εit. (5.4)
The restriction in (5.2) for t = 0, 1 implies E[(1, Di1, t, Dit)·εit] =
0, so all the parameters in equation (5.4), including treatment ef-
fect γ, can be estimated by ordinary least squares3. Notice, that the
model allows any kind of dependence between selection for treat-
ment, Di1 = 1, and the individual-specific component, ηi. This
model is called “difference-in-differences”, because under the identi-
fying condition in equation (5.2) we have
γ = {E[Yi1|Di1 = 1]− E[Yi1|Di1 = 0]}
− {E[Yi0|Di1 = 1]− E[Yi0|Di1 = 0]},
(5.5)
and the least square estimator of γ is the sample counterpart of
equation (5.5).
In equation (5.4) estimable by OLS as already mentioned, the Yit is an out-
come measure for particular individual in one of two periods, Di1 is a dummy
variable signalising, whether person received treatment, while Dit can be re-
written as interaction term Di1 · t, which is effectively just a dummy variable
equal to 1, if person was exposed to treatment and the period is post-treatment.
3If true panel data are available, model is even more straightforward, statistically powerful
and greatly simplifies.
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Among the parameters estimated α is a common intercept for all obser-
vations, β shifts this intercept for treated only, δ is an effect of time on all
units and finally γ is our main target of interest, Average Treatment Effect on
the Treated (ATT) and according to equation (5.5) it can be seen as a causal
parameter and excess difference to the common difference between treated and
controls, because of exposure to the treatment, if the underlying assumptions
are met.
The expected values of parameters of interest of the model above are sum-
marized in a comprehensive Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Parameters of Interest in Difference-in-Differences Model
Pre-Treatment Post-Treatment Difference
Treated Units α + β α + β + δ + γ δ + γ
Control Units α α + δ δ
Difference β β + γ γ
5.3.3 Extending the Difference-in-Differences Model
The basic model for two periods can be easily extended for multiple periods and
groups, as well as by adding covariates as control variables that may not only
help the model to be more statistically powerful but also control for confounding
trends (Angrist & Pischke 2008). The model then looks as following:
Yigt = α + βDg + δ ·Dt + γDgt + πXigt + εigt, (5.6)
where Dg are group dummy variables, Dt are year dummies
4, Dgt is an
indicator for treatment group in post-treatment period and Xigt is a vector of
covariates either on individual or group level.




Summarizing the we have two treatment groups—low and high educated in-
dividuals, and one control group—people with middle level of education and
we employ a difference-in-differences estimator for two possible margins of the
labour supply as dependent variables.
Economic theory suggest that if there are any responses, they should con-
centrate mostly at the extensive margin, i.e. labour force participation for the
low-skilled workers, while it should be more about hours of work response at
intensive margin for the high-skilled. For the former case one may expect the
rise in employment of low-educated due to increase in the market wage caused
by fall in the effective marginal tax rate many of these individuals possibly
faced, and thus (for at least some of them) it might become greater than the
reservation wage. Sign of hours of work response of already working is am-
biguous, as it depends on the relative strengths of income and substitution
effects for our groups of interest. Nevertheless, most of the studies agree on
greater responsiveness at the extensive margin (Eissa & Liebman 1996; Meyer
& Rosenbaum 2001; Blundell et al. 2011)
Expressed in mathematical form, the specification of our model looks as
follows:
Yigt = α + β ·Dg + δ ·Dt + γ ·Dgt + π ·Xigt + εigt, (6.1)
where Yigt are hours of work or labour force participation, respectively, Dg is
low or high educated group indicator, Dt are year dummies, Dgt is an indicator
of the treated in post-reform period and in fact the interaction effect of the
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previous two, if there are only two periods and two groups. Xigt are covariates
that should lower the variation in the error term, control for some uncaptured
differences between groups and may vary across individuals, groups or time.
Unfortunately, there is a lack of continuous variables in our survey data,
thus our covariates include regional dummies at Nomenclature of Territorial
Units for Statistics (NUTS 2) level, degree of urbanisation indicators, marital
status (for single-member households may seem weird, see subsection 5.1.1
though) and gender indicators, and age bands dummies.
The relative heterogeneity across the defined groups by covariates is assessed
in Table 6.1. For example low-educated have substantially greater average age
and are dominated by females, while people with tertiary education live mostly
in the densely populated areas. Even if we deal with one-person households,
almost 10% of them claim to be married. Thus it is questionable if the control
group would mimic the counterfactual behaviour of the treatment groups in
the absence of treatment.
Table 6.1: Sample Characteristics According to Level of Education
Low Middle High
Age 49 42 40
Females 0.576412 0.39304 0.414781
Married 0.048105 0.067593 0.096047
City 0.273894 0.382943 0.591746
Town 0.251229 0.211649 0.166135
Both models are linear and since labour force participation is a binary
choice, its Difference-in-Differences (DiD) estimator is in fact a linear prob-
ability model. Despite it is well known that this model is heteroskedastic
from definition, it has some preferable properties unless not intended for pre-
dictions, like straightforward interpretation without burdensome computing of
marginal effects and easy implementation within difference-in-differences frame-
work. Heteroskedasticity can be easily corrected for by using some type of
robust standard errors. For suggestion of very sophisticated non-linear DiD
models see e.g. Athey & Imbens (2006).
6.1.1 Assumptions, Their Validity and Potential Difficulties
Let us recall the two most important assumptions for difference-in-differences
estimator to be consistent:
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1. Parallel trends assumption: Time effects are assumed to have common
effects across treated and controls. If both groups share similar trends
with stable difference between them, then DiD procedure recovers ATT.
The difficulties might arise when demographic composition of treatment
and control groups significantly differ; empirically the trends and business
cycles don’t have the same impact on single/married, men/women, high-
skilled/low-skilled workers, which is essentially also our case.
2. Stable composition assumption: Composition of both groups must re-
main stable before and after treatment. If the individuals in each group
have the same characteristics before and after the change, differencing
eliminates averages of unobserved individual effects. Unfortunately, even
if the DiD successfully recovers ATT, this is subject to conventional sample
selection biases and cannot be used to simulate policy responses (Blundell
& Macurdy 1999).
When one or both of these conditions are not fulfilled, Abadie (2005) pro-
posed to use non-parametric approach—namely propensity score matching—
together with difference-in-differences. Another famous paper published by
Bertrand et al. (2004) advises to correct for serial correlation if using multiple
periods in order to obtain reliable standard errors and test statistics.
6.2 Trends in Employment and Hours of Work
At first, we provide an overview of employment and hours of work development
in Table 6.2 according to levels of education. In upper part of the table, there
are employment figures in percent, while at the bottom, there are average
weekly working hours in a given year for those who were employed.
Table 6.2: Employment and Hours of Work Development
2006 2007 2008 2009
Low (%) 49.40 52.95 52.37 51.00
Medium (%) 77.38 80.19 80.90 79.42
High (%) 91.64 94.37 91.76 89.60
Low 39.92 40.38 40.81 41.02
Medium 42.09 42.37 42.61 42.19
High 43.58 43.00 44.12 44.02
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Since we have data for two periods before the policy change and two periods
after, we cannot sufficiently assess the parallel trends assumption. Yet, at
Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 are depicted trends for employment and hours of
work, respectively. The three lines reflects our treatment and control groups
defined according to level of education over the years we have data for.
Figure 6.1: Employment Figure 6.2: Hours of Work
Source: Author’s computations (2015)
From the previous graphs it is hard to tell, whether there are some paral-
lel trends, it rather seems there are not. Most probably, the groups are too
heterogeneous and their responses to overall macroeconomic shocks are differ-
ent. For example, one might assume the impact of global economic crisis on
employment of low-skilled and high-skilled workers was fairly different.
Figure 6.3: Workers’ Usual Weekly Working Hours
Source: Author’s computations (2015)
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As for hours of work, it is known that there is a substantial measurement
error on these values reported in the survey data (Bound et al. 1994). Many
workers are paid fixed monthly salary and they make a little effort to track
how many hours they work in a week. Thus we might expect many of the
respondents just report 40 hours a week. Figure 6.3 shows almost 60% of
workers reported 40 hours as their usual weekly working time. Moreover, most
of the employees have set their working time in the contract and cannot freely
decide for number of hours.
To see the patterns in the data in more detail, we further split the education
groups according to the age of individuals to 4 subgroups for every education
level group. Overall, in the sample we have men and women aged 20–60, divide
them by 10-year bands and finally match them according to education level.
The trends for employment and working hours can be observed at Figure 6.4
and Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.4: Trends in Employment by Age Groups and Level Of Edu-
cation
Source: Author’s computations (2015)
The figures reveal significant heterogeneity especially within the group of
low education level. The younger half seemed to be vulnerable to worsening
economic conditions and in 2009 their employment rapidly declined possibly at
least partially due to massive layoffs. It is also obvious that the low-skilled in-
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dividuals aged over 40 suffer from low labour market participation levels. Sim-
ilar trend can be observed also for the persons with completed upper secondary
education but just in the age category above 50 years, where the difference in
employment between the two groups fell approximately by on half. This issue
is frequently stressed also by the media and it raises a question, to what extent
is this voluntary. Beside this age subgroup, other medium level educated and
all high educated maintain relatively high and stable levels of employment with
the youngest cohorts working slightly less.
Figure 6.5: Trends in Usual Weekly Working Hours by Age Groups
and Level Of Education
Source: Author’s computations (2015)
At the first glance, the hours of work exhibit a bit more variation over
the groups and cohorts, yet, one should be cautious with making preliminary
conclusions, because of hours of work rigidity and measurement error typically
present in the survey data, as discussed in previous paragraphs.
When the sample is split into 3 groups of education level times 4 age groups,
the subsamples suffer from considerably lowered number of observation, which
can make it difficult to meet especially the second assumption of the same
groups composition randomly drawn from the same population before and after
the policy change if used for possible DiD estimation over these smaller sub-
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groups. In the Table 6.3 we provide absolute numbers of individuals of the
given age groups within the specific level of education.
Table 6.3: Number of Individuals in the Specific Age-Education
Clusters
Age group
20 - 30 30 - 40 40 - 50 50 - 60 Total
Low 306 354 803 2,637 4,100
Middle 6,576 6,940 5,794 10,874 30,184
High 1,542 1,996 1,347 1,733 6,618
Total 8,424 9,290 7,944 15,244 40,902
6.3 Estimation Results
In this part of the chapter we present the most important estimation results and
their possible interpretation. Full table with all estimated parameters including
covariates can be found in Appendix A.
First we examined the responses for the first treatment group—individuals
living alone with completed primary or lower secondary education. From the
Table 6.4 it seems that contrary to our intuition the treatment parameter γ is
slightly negative and on average it looks that combination of treatment (group)
and “post-” period lowered the probability of employment among the low edu-
cated by -0.53% and it is significant at 95% level of confidence.
As for covariates, the most significant is parameter on age, which is ex-
pressed in 5-year bands between 20-60, with the value almost equal to DiD
coefficient. Being female lowers the probability of labour force participation in
contrast to being married, even if living alone. Most of the regional dummies
beside the two Moravian regions are not different from Prague, which is the
base category, the urbanisation degree has no distinct effect to base category
city as well.
Estimation results for hours of work of low-skilled workers in Table 6.5
shows significant interaction coefficient, that caused increase in working hours
on average by 0.294. In this case, several regional dummies coefficients are
significant, estimated impact on female and married indicators are also signi-
ficant, and have negative and positive sign, respectively. For hours of work,
age is, however, not significant.
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Table 6.4: DiD Estimation: Labour Force Participation of Low Edu-
cated
Before After
Control Treated Diff Control Treated Diff DiD
Employed 1.038 0.818 -0.220 1.043 0.817 -0.225 -0.005
Std.Error (0.019) (0.023) (0.005) (0.019) (0.024) (0.006) (0.001)
Sample 7782 1072 7653 1137
R2: 0.088
Standard errors clustered at group-year level in parentheses
Table 6.5: DiD Estimation: Hours of Work of Low Educated
Before After
Control Treated Diff Control Treated Diff DiD
Hours 44.522 43.040 -1.482 44.647 43.460 -1.187 0.294
Std.Error (0.499) (0.578) (0.080) (0.483) (0.547) (0.066) (0.019)
Sample 6124 556 6079 580
R2: 0.050
Standard errors clustered at group-year level in parentheses
Surprisingly, for the highly educated the extensive margin seems to be even
more significant than for the low educated. The coefficient of interest is neg-
ative and can be interpreted as 3.27% decrease in labour force participation
probability of high-skilled workers. Most of the covariates have same effect as
in the previous case, i.e. increasing age and being female lower probability of
working, while being married leads to the opposite. The only region distinct
from Prague is Central Moravia and Moravia-Silesia as before.
Table 6.6: DiD Estimation: Labour Force Participation of Highly
Educated
Before After
Control Treated Diff Control Treated Diff DiD
Employed 1.000 1.142 0.142 1.005 1.114 0.109 -0.033
Std.Error (0.023) (0.023) (0.002) (0.023) (0.023) (0.002) (0.000)
Sample 7782 1396 7653 1466
R2: 0.055
Standard errors clustered at group-year level in parentheses
The intensive margin of labour supply of high-skilled workers is in fact
“intensive”—interaction of post-reform period and being in the group of highly
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educated caused on average increase in working hours by 0.839. Female indic-
ator plus many regional dummies have highly significant and negative coeffi-
cient, indicating that working hours probably increased mostly for highly edu-
cated males in Prague, which are the base categories. Age and marriage seem
to have no effect in this case.
Table 6.7: DiD Estimation: Hours of Work of Highly Educated
Before After
Control Treated Diff Control Treated Diff DiD
Employed 44.298 44.703 0.404 44.414 45.657 1.243 0.839
Std.Error (0.374) (0.348) (0.044) (0.363) (0.340) (0.047) (0.011)
Sample 6124 1280 6079 1320
R2: 0.051
Standard errors clustered at group-year level in parentheses
Despite all four coefficients on the treatment groups in the post-reform
period are significant, it is questionable, whether it is an ATT, what was re-
covered by the DiD estimator. We believe that due to heterogeneity of the
selected groups and their possible distinct reaction to macroeconomic shocks it
is probably not, hence it would be very daring to interpret the effects as causal.
Moreover, to perform some robustness checks like triple differences or placebo
DiD, usual for the method employed, is pretty hard due to lack of available
control groups for the former method and almost no recent years without any
change in tax or welfare policy, that wouldn’t have affected at least some part
of the population in the Czech Republic. Although empirical studies suggest
single mothers or married women respond more to wage rate changes, in the
case of Czech Republic e.g. for the latter group the response to markedly
broadened non-working spouse and children tax credits might be to the large
extent offset by the abolition of joint taxation of married couples (Kaĺı̌sková
2014).
The attempt to assess the 2008 tax reform from the labour supply per-
spective provide a solid basis for further research. It might involve more care-
fully defined treatment and control groups that might be more responsive to
the exogenous changes in disposable income, slightly different methods such as
propensity score matching difference-in-differences, instrumental variables com-




In the previous 6 chapters we tried to evaluate the comprehensive tax scheme
reform adopted in the 2008 in the Czech Republic based on labour supply re-
sponses of one-person households using quasi-experimental method known as
difference-in-differences by exploiting the adoption of the single flat personal
income tax rate as a natural experiment. The workers’ responses were estim-
ated at the intensive (hours of work) and extensive (labour force participation)
margins of the labour supply elasticity controlling for several additional factors.
After comprehensive description of the adopted reform and setting theor-
etical ground for the chosen model we have constructed treatment and control
groups using European Labour Force Survey yearly microdata for 2006–2009,
with highest attained level of education as a proxy for income, that would
assign particular individual to the associated pre- and post-reform tax brack-
ets. Based on the simple microsimulation we estimated the income ranges, for
which the effective income tax rates changed considerably and for which the
change was rather negligible, thus the people in latter group would mimic the
responses of the former in the absence of treatment.
Taking changes in the effective tax rate as an exogenous treatment only
part of the population is exposed to, we assumed that assignment to treatment
was as good as random, which in the end might not be the case due to very
heterogeneous characteristics of the constructed groups. These probably react
differently to a aggregate macroeconomic shocks over time, thus not fulfilling
the assumption of “parallel trends” crucial for the DiD procedure to recover
consistent estimate of ATT.
Despite our results suggest all parameters of interest were found significant,
at least some of them are not of expected sign and magnitude, hence cannot be
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interpreted as causal owing to the tax reform. Specifically, we found significant
negative impact on labour force participation of low-skilled, but especially high-
skilled individuals and significant positive impact on hours of work of already
employed within both groups.
These results should be approached with caution due to a number of reasons:
possible endogeneity of the policy change caused by targeting specific groups in
a non-random way, measurement error of hours of work typical for the survey
data and their rigidity due to employment contracts, possible impact of the
reform in the long-run rather than immediately, and at last but not least the
extensive social welfare reform that was adopted the year before and other
partial changes in the tax and benefits system occurring almost every year
make it harder to isolate the effects of the selected tax reform and compare the
outcomes before and after this policy change.
The attempt to assess the 2008 tax reform from the labour supply perspect-
ive provide a solid basis for further research. It might involve carefully defined
alternative treatment and control groups based on the valid exclusion restric-
tion that might be more comparable and responsive to the exogenous changes
in disposable income. This can be achieved by using slightly different methods
such as semi-parametric propensity score matching difference-in-differences, in-
strumental variables combined with a comprehensively defined structural model
or the currently very popular synthetic control methods.
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Figure A.1: Overall Tax Wedge for a One-Person Household
Source: Author’s computations (2015)
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Figure A.2: Monthly Gross Wages Deciles Distribution by Education
Source: European Labour Force Survey & Author’s computations (2015)
A. Appendix III
Table A.1: Difference-in-Differences Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Employed Hours of work Employed Hours of work
Treated -0.220*** -1.482*** 0.142*** 0.404***
(0.00466) (0.0796) (0.00202) (0.0440)
After 0.00443*** 0.125*** 0.00486*** 0.116***
(0.000521) (0.0172) (0.000330) (0.0158)
DiD -0.00527** 0.294*** -0.0327*** 0.839***
(0.00144) (0.0188) (0.000350) (0.0106)
Age -0.00518*** 0.00324 -0.00430*** 0.0171
(0.000426) (0.00741) (0.000602) (0.00740)
Female -0.0884** -2.730*** -0.0798** -2.814***
(0.0155) (0.136) (0.0187) (0.144)
Married 0.0826** 1.630* 0.0634*** 1.328
(0.0191) (0.616) (0.00798) (0.568)
Central Bohemia 0.0261 -0.538 0.00942 -1.080
(0.0168) (0.659) (0.0182) (0.657)
Southwest 0.0180 -1.928** -0.0120 -2.192**
(0.0170) (0.378) (0.0256) (0.400)
Northwest 0.0161 -2.646*** 0.0206 -3.071***
(0.0149) (0.391) (0.0101) (0.450)
Northeast 0.0142 -0.841 -0.0140 -0.951*
(0.0144) (0.373) (0.0145) (0.376)
Southeast -0.0431 -2.159*** -0.0468 -2.644**
(0.0271) (0.320) (0.0237) (0.548)
Central Moravia -0.0554** -1.932* -0.0517*** -2.537**
(0.0128) (0.613) (0.00555) (0.633)
Moravia-Silesia -0.0392** -3.056*** -0.0351** -3.480***
(0.0121) (0.250) (0.00707) (0.454)
Town 0.0274 0.165 0.0332 0.340*
(0.0168) (0.187) (0.0160) (0.117)
Rural 0.0292 0.425 0.0459* 0.438
(0.0230) (0.197) (0.0158) (0.191)
Constant 1.038*** 44.52*** 1.000*** 44.30***
(0.0194) (0.499) (0.0230) (0.374)
Observations 17,644 13,339 18,270 14,803
R2 0.088 0.050 0.055 0.051
Treated Low Low High High
Before 2007 2007 2007 2007
After 2008 2008 2008 2008
Std. errors clustered at group-year level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
